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COMMENTARY

REVITALIZING THE CONSUMER PRODUCT
SAFETY COMMISSION
Carl Tobias•
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), having recently
celebrated its sixteenth birthday, no longer can claim to be a young
agency. On October 27, 1972, Congress created the Commission to protect
individuals from deaths and injuries caused by dangerous or defective
consumer products. 1 Yet the CPSC, as it approaches maturity, has failed
to fulfill numerous purposes for which Congress established it.
Congress acted at the instigation of the National Commission on
Product Safety, an entity it created in 1967 to assess risks posed by consumer products and to ascertain whether consumers needed new protections to reduce harm attributable to those products. 2 The National Commission conducted a thorough analysis and issued a Final Report during
1970 in which it found that unreasonable product hazards exposed the
public to undue risk and that existing safeguards, such as federal and
state consumer product safety legislation, manufacturer self-regulation,
and common law tort suits, were insufficient. 3 Accordingly, the Commission recommended that Congress create an agency with substantial power
to regulate consumer products.4 Congress followed that suggestion by establishing the CPSC as an independent regulatory commission and endowing it with authority to regulate some ten thousand products manu• Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Bob Adler and Peggy Sanner for
valuable suggestions and to the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that
remain are mine alone.
1. See Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
2051-2083 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). For analyses of the CPSC's creation and of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) which created it, see Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899 (1973); Schwartz, The
Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32 (1982).
2. See Joint Resolution to Establish a National Commission on Product Safety, Pub.
L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466 (1967). For discussions of the National Commission's creation
and its work, see Scalia & Goodman, supra note 1, at 900-01; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 3641.
3. See NATIONAL CoMM'N ON PROD. SAFETY, FINAL REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 1-3 (1970).
4. See id. at 3.
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factured and distributed by more than one million businesses. 11 The
agency, created in the hope that federal regulation would reduce significantly product risks, has not achieved this goal. 6
The CPSC's efforts have seemed star-crossed from the outset. All of
the problems plagued it that attend creation of any governmental agency,
such as identifying constituents and setting priorities. 7 Congress assigned
the CPSC statutory responsibilities that were difficult to accomplish and
procedures for implementing them which could not be applied efficiently. 8
The most important illustration of these phenomena was the process
for promulgating consumer product safety standards, compulsory safety
requirements to be imposed on manufacturers. 9 Congress saddled the
CPSC with relatively novel, untested procedures for setting those standards, and the procedures ultimately proved extraordinarily complex and
time-consuming. 10 The agency admirably attempted to carry out its statutory obligation to develop safety standards, but the Commission committed a number of mistakes.
The CPSC decided to develop mandatory standards for several products, such as swimming pool slides, for which the requirements were only
marginally necessary because the products presented little danger or were
amenable to treatment with voluntary standards. 11 Correspondingly, it
tried to develop complex compulsory standards for other products, such
as lawn mowers, which posed risks that could not be remedied easily with
mandatory requirements. 12 Moreover, the Commission laudably attempted to maximize public participation in those initiatives and was one
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (1976) established the CPSC. For figures on the number of
products and businesses, see Schwartz, supra note 1, at 43.
6. Congress fashioned the CPSA as a thorough regulatory system "to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products." See 15 U.S.C. §
2051(b)(l) (1976).
7. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 76; Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched
Compensation: Government Sponsored Public Participation In Proceedings of The Consumer Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1101, 1161 (1986).
8. For the most comprehensive assessment of these difficulties, see Schwartz, supra
note 1.
9. For thorough analysis of the "offeror" process for developing these standards, see
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 57-95. For examination of the seven offeror proceedings conducted to develop the standards, see Tobias, Early Alternative Dispute Resolution in a
Federal Administrative Agency Context: Experimentation with the Offeror Process at the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409 (1987).
10. For descriptions of the procedures and the difficulties entailed in employing them,
see Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory
Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 Tux. L. REV. 1329, 1400-01, 1412-16
(1978); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 57-68, 75-77.
11. For an analysis of the proceedings to develop standards for matchbooks, swimming
pool slides, television receivers, and miniature Christmas tree lights, finding that the products presented little danger or were amenable to treatment with voluntary standards, see
Tobias, supra note 9, at 437-58.
12. For analyses of the lawn mower proceeding which reach the conclusions in the
text, see Schwartz, supra note 1, at 77-94; Tobias, supra note 9, at 424-37.
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of the most solicitous federal agencies in this respect. 13 Even that effort,
however, haunted the CPSC, as neither producers nor consumers could
resist the temptation to provide ever-increasing amounts of input, which
complicated already prolix proceedings. 14
Some of these attempts to write safety standards, which cost the
agency hundreds of thousands of dollars and certain industries much
more, resulted in no standards or led to requirements that afforded little
additional protection for the public. 15 The standard-setting endeavors
and considerable additional Commission activity which occurred from the
agency's inception until approximately 1978 made the CPSC appear less
effective than it was and undermined the agency's credibility at a critical
juncture in its brief existence. 16
The Commission was rejuvenated in the late 1970s, however. The
CPSC improved its standing by redefining the agency's focus, especially
in deciding to develop fewer mandatory standards in-house while encouraging manufacturers' organizations, such as trade associations, to upgrade
voluntary requirements. 17 Nevertheless, the Commission's comparative
success was relatively short-lived, ending roughly with the advent of the
Reagan administration.
The difficulties which the CPSC experienced in its early years were
exacerbated by developments that occurred during the second half of the
13. See Adler, From "Model Agency" To Basket Case: Can the Consumer Product
Safety Commission Be Redeemed?, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 61 (1989); CPSC Oversight: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., !st Sess. 351 (1977) (statement of Professor Hamilton)
[hereinafter 1977 House Oversight Hearings].
14. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 75, 95; 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note
13, at 349-55 (statement of Professor Hamilton). For analysis of the difficulties an agency
can create when it is too open to public involvement, see Statler, Let the Sunshine In?, 67
A.B.A. J. 573 (1981).
15. The CPSC spent more than $800,000 attempting to develop standards for public
playground equipment. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 460. Cf. Tobias, supra note 7, at 1138
(non-offeror attempt to develop standards for chain saws cost industry more than $1,000,000
and the Commission more than $500,000). The agency ultimately failed to promulgate any
standards for television receivers, miniature Christmas tree lights, or public playground
equipment. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 451, 455, 460. Courts invalidated certain components of the architectural glass, matchbook, and swimming pool slide standards that were
promulgated. See id. at 419, 439, 447. This meant that these, and especially the swimming
pool slide standard, offered the public little additional protection. See United States CPSC,
Statutory Rule Review Report to Congress 19-21 (May 1980) (pool slide standard offered
minimal safety benefit and was anti-competitive).
16. For analyses of considerable additional CPSC activity, especially relating to its
procedures, which made it appear Jess effective and undermined its credibility, see Adler,
supra note 13, at 70-73; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 45-55, 68-70, 94-95. Both of these authors indicate the CPSC may not have deserved criticism and attribute its perceived ineffectiveness to factors for which CPSC was not responsible or could not control, such as Congressionally prescribed procedures. See Adler, supra at 70-73; Schwartz, supra at 62-67, 75,
95.
17. This development has been attributed to the leadership of CPSC's Chairman, Susan King. See Adler, supra note 13, at 73-74.
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agency's existence. The Reagan administration's anti-regulatory perspectives directly contravene much embodied in CPSC's statutory mandate. 18
Thus, since the early 1980s, the emphases at CPSC, as at many other
federal agencies, have been on deregulation, cooperation with manufacturers, voluntary controls and voluntary compliance, "prosecutorial discretion" (not to sue those who may be violating the law), and information
and education campaigns. 19 Symptomatic of this anti-regulatory climate
was resolution of the all-terrain vehicle (ATV) "problem." 2° For several
years, the CPSC "negotiated" with manufacturers, even as the agency acknowledged that with each month which passed the vehicles would be
responsible for an additional twenty deaths, ten of which would be children. 21 At the instigation of the Justice Department, the Commission finally entered into an unprecedented "consent decree," which permitted
the continued sale of four-wheel ATVs while requiring manufacturers to
institute safety education campaigns for riders and cease production of
three-wheel ATVs. 22
Critics should not ascribe what has happened at the CPSC during
the 1980s solely to the Reagan administration. Congress also bears substantial responsibility for the developments. In 1981, it amended the
agency's organic statute in ways that make the standard-setting procedure so complex that it is virtually unworkable. 23 Moreover, Congress
18. These anti-regulatory perspectives are reflected in initiatives commenced at the
inception of the Administration, such as issuance of Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127
(1981) and creation of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief. Indeed, the Administration
attempted to abolish the CPSC. See Letter from David Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to Senator Robert Kasten, Chairman, Consumer Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (May 8, 1981). Congress rejected this effort. See H.R. REP. No. 99-377, 99th Cong., !st Sess. 7 (1985).
19. These phenomena are particularly troubling at agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration, which like CPSC, have important responsibilities for protecting public health and safety. For analysis of the efficacy
of education programs, see Adler & Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159 (1984).
20. These are off-road vehicles which initially were used by ranchers as general-purpose work machines but which have enjoyed sales exceeding 500,000 vehicles in each of the
last several years because of advertising portraying them as recreational vehicles for the
family.
21. As numerous inexperienced drivers operated the vehicles, the number of deaths
rose substantially, from 26 in 1982 to 268 in 1986. During 1986, 85,000 injuries requiring
emergency room treatment were ascribed to ATVs. See Government Asks Limits on AllTerrain Vehicles, N. Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1987, at Al.
22. See United States v. American Honda Co., Inc., Civ. Act. No. 87-3525 (April 27,
1988); see also Buckley and Rooney, All-Terrain Vehicles, 24 TRIAL 56 (Nov. 1988); Egan,
Roar in the Wilderness Raises Ire Over Vehicles, N. Y. Times, July 15, 1988, at A12. Another casualty of anti-regulatory perspectives at CPSC and other agencies has been reimbursement of the public for costs incurred when participating in administrative proceedings.
See Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 CoLUM. L. REV.
906 (1982).
23. See Consumer Product Safety Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95
Stat. 703 (1981). For analysis of the amendments, see Klayman, Standard Setting Under
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participated willingly with the administration in mandating large budget
cuts that would have crippled the CPSC, even had it wanted to act more
vigorously. 24
The agency, on its sixteenth birthday, stands wounded, as do
thousands of Americans whose injuries from defective or dangerous products might have been prevented by a CPSC more attentive to its responsibilities. Many possible constructive measures exist to revitalize the
Commission in the near future, however. The new administration and the
new Congress should revise the agency's powers and streamline its procedures, especially for standard setting, 211 while restoring sufficient appropriations to facilitate the CPSC's effective accomplishment of its difficult
but important missions. 28 President Bush should nominate and the Senate should confirm commissioners more committed to implementing vigorously the agency's statutory obligations. 27 Moreover, Congress and the
CPSC must think constructively about novel ways of promoting increased
product safety, such as developing incentives for manufacturers that
evince a commitment to reducing risks posed by their products. 28 Those
measures should enable the CPSC to achieve more efficaciously the task
of protecting the American people from dangerous and defective products, the purpose for which the agency was created.

the Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981-A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 96 (1982).
24. The most drastic cut came in the 1982 fiscal year budget when CPSC lost 25% of
its appropriations and staff. Since then, CPSC's budget has remained relatively the same so
that for fiscal year 1989 it requested the same amount as for fiscal year 1982.
25. For suggestions as to possible revisions, see Adler, supra note 13, at 82-129;
Klayman, supra note 23. For suggestions relating to revival of participant reimbursement,
see Tobias, supra note 7, at 1163-64.
26. It is difficult to pinpoint a precise figure that would be appropriate; however, one
target might be the level in constant dollars at which CPSC was funded in its first budget
for fiscal year 1974 (CPSC's request for 1989 represents a 59% drop).
27. I am not saying that appointees necessarily must be "pro-regulation." Rather, protecting the American people from dangerous and defective products should be their top
priority. For discussion of "reluctant regulators," see Adler, supra note 13, at 76.
28. Manufacturers frequently complain that safety does not sell or pay.

